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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
False Advertising—Restrictions on Freedom of Speech and Freedom of
Circulation.—Rodale Press, Inc.' —The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
issued a complaint against Rodale Press, Inc., and Rodale Books, Inc., Penn-
sylvania corporations, alleging violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act2 in the advertising of three of their publications, "The Health
Finder," "How to Eat for a Healthy Heart," and "This Pace is Not Killing
Us." The complaint, which dealt mainly with the advertisements for the book,
"The Health Finder," alleged that respondents were representing, directly or
by implication, that the ideas and suggestions contained in the book would
allow readers to add years to their lives, gain more energy, effectuate savings
on medical and dental bills, feel better than ever before, and gain and main-
tain health. It was additionally alleged that the advertising indicated that
readers of the book would find therein the answers to all health problems,
including how to free themselves from colds, how to prevent ulcers, and
how to prevent high blood pressure; and that the ideas and suggestions con-
tained in the publication were effective in the prevention, relief and treatment
of cancer, tuberculosis, infantile paralysis, heart disease, arthritis and mental
illness. The complaint stated that the ideas and suggestions contained in
"The Health Finder" would not produce such advertised results, and that
reliance on the assertions made in the advertisements might result in the
progression of serious diseases before medical consultation was sought. The
complaint charged that these practices constituted unfair and deceptive
practices and unfair methods of competition in commerce, and prayed that
a cease and desist order issue forbidding the respondent from making such
claims.
The respondents filed with the hearing examiner a motion to dismiss
the complaint, or in the alternative, to certify to the Commission the ques-
tions therein presented. This motion was denied. Respondents thereupon
filed a request to file an interlocutory appeal from the ruling of the hearing
examiner, under Section 3.20 of the Commission's Rules of Practice. 3 In
addition, respondents submitted a memorandum in support of this latter
request, contending that any order issued in the proceeding would be fruitless
because the book named in the complaint was neither in general circulation
nor being advertised any longer, and also that respondents' medical witnesses
would endorse both the book named in the complaint and the advertising of
the book, thus rendering trial of the issues unnecessary.
HELD: Request to file an interlocutory appeal denied, and proceedings
remanded to the hearing examiner for a full hearing on the issues.
The Commission, Commissioner Elman dissenting, dismissed the first
contention by stating that the mere discontinuance of the specific advertise-
ments named in the complaint was not sufficient to warrant a dismissal of
the hearing, since the respondents did not clearly allege that the type of
advertising which was the subject of the complaint was no longer being
used.4
1
 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 17,149 (1964).
2
 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
a 16 C.F.R. § 3.20 (1960).
1
 It has been held that "abandonment [of the challenged advertising] will not be
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As to the second argument propounded by the respondents for discon-
tinuance of the action, the Commission noted that even assuming that the
respondents' medical witnesses would testify to the medical soundness of the
ideas contained in the book, this would not warrant a dismissal of the com-
plaint. The Commission emphasized that the complaint did not allege that
the ideas and suggestions set forth in the book were false and of no medical
value, but rather that the advertisement created the false impression that by
following the recommendations, certain specific beneficial results would fol-
low, such as better health, freedom from disease and greater enjoyment of
life. The Commission added that because of this latter consideration, the
medical endorsement of the statements contained in the book would not
be dispositive of the issue. The Commission further pointed out that the
ultimate conclusion of whether or not respondents' advertisement of the
book was deceptive was one for the Commission to decide after a full hear-
ing, and not one which might be delegated to experts called by either side.8
Commissioner Elman, construing the advertisement as representing
truthfully what the book is about, dissented on the grounds that the complaint
in essence challenged the book and the ideas in it. He pointed out that while
the ideas contained in the publication may be completely unfounded, still
the respondents have a constitutional right to disseminate them. He con-
cluded that the Commission was saying that while the respondents may
have a constitutional right to publish "The Health Finder," they have no
right to advertise the book, even truthfully, because the ideas and suggestions
contained in it are not effective. He further concluded that this would
amount, in effect, to a ban of all advertising of the publication.
Commissioner Elman's dissent appears to be based on a different concep-
tion of the facts. His opinion indicates a belief that the advertisement is but
a repetition of the views presented in the book. However, the advertisement
goes beyond the mere enumeration of the ideas contained in the publication,
and states as conclusions that certain indicated results will follow from an
observance of such suggestions. Thus the advertisement can be seen as mak-
ing unqualified statements of fact, and if the determination be made that
presumed and, even though pleaded and presently effective, is no bar to the entry of an
enforcement order. . . . There is no guaranty that the acts complained of will not be
renewed if the relief prayed [in the complaint] is denied." FTC v. Wallace, 75 F.2d 733,
738 (8th Cir. 1935). See also FTC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U.S. 257, 260
(1938) ; Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282, 284 (6th Cir. 1941).
5
 "Short of requiring a representative poll in each case to see if people actually are
deceived, the question can most practically be decided as it is, by a commission, deemed
to have both expertness and experience in dealing with false advertising, drawing on its
experience to determine the natural and probable result of the questioned advertising
technique." Comment, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 704, 726 (1964). In making such
determination, the Commission has broad discretion as to what evidence it will hear.
16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1960). The Commission, while often considering samples of public
opinion as to the interpretation to be given an advertisement, can attribute to such
opinion polls as much evidentiary weight as it desires. See Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v.
FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1953) ; accord, Gulf Off Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106,
108 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Stanley Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 388, 391-92 (9th Cir.
1943).
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such conclusions are not true, the representations may be forbidden by the
Commission.°
Commissioner Elman's dissent presents grave questions as to the permis-
sible scope of FTC regulation with respect to constitutional mandates. These
questions are made manifest by the prospect of an advertisement which merely
restates the subject matter and conclusions contained in a publication, if the
publication presents radical conceptions in an area of major public interest
such as health. If the author of a health manual posits the view that a certain
regimen will cure a serious disease, and in the advertisement for the book,
several of the assertions made in the publication are reprinted without quali-
fication, could the FTC prohibit the use of the advertising on the finding that
the procedure in fact will not cure the disease? This question is basically the
same as that which Commissioner Elman felt was before the FTC.
On the basis of prior holdings of the United States Supreme Court and
lower federal courts on the extent to which the constitutional protection of
free speech extends to advertisements,' it seems that it would be within the
power of the FTC to restrict the publication of such advertisements. Before
the validity of this position is assessed, however, it would be advisable to
consider the history of the application of the Federal Trade Commission Act
to the advertisement of health books and to study the decisional law which
has been developed in this field.
The FTC was first empowered to regulate advertising by the enactment
of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. 8
 Although the original act
made no reference to false advertising, section 5, which limited the Com-
mission's jurisdiction to "unfair methods of competition in commerce,"9 was
construed to indicate that Congress intended to include false advertising. 10
The original statutory provisions were buttressed by congressional enactment
of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938," which, in addition to providing
four new sections to the original act, amended section 5, making it read
6 See, e.g., Capon Water Co. v. FTC, 107 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1939), in which issuance
of a cease and desist order was affirmed on the basis that there was no truth in
petitioner's advertisement that its bottled water would cure 52 diseases; Charles of the
Ritz v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944), in which the Commission found that
petitioner's advertisement represented that the product would restore the natural elements
necessary for a healthy skin.
7
 In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the petitioner attacked a New
York City sanitary code provision forbidding the distribution in the streets of commercial
and business advertising matter. The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality
of the provision, said that while the Constitution restricts the states and municipalities
from unduly burdening the freedom of communication of information and the dissemi-
nation of opinion, still it "imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising." Id. at 54. In American Medicinal Products v. FTC, 136 F.2d
426, 427 (9th Cir. 1943), the court said "petitioners have no constitutional right to
disseminate false advertisements by the United States mail or by any means in com-
merce. . . ."
8 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958).
9 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
10
 Barnes, False Advertising, 23 Ohio St, L.J. 597, 605 (1962). The first two cases
decided under this statute dealt with false advertising. FTC v. Abbott & Co., I F.T.C. 16
(1916) ; FTC v. Circle Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C. 13 (1916).
11 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-58 (1958).
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"unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 12 This latter change was
prompted by the Supreme Court's holding in FTC v. Raladam Co. 13 that,
before the FTC could take jurisdiction of an alleged unfair practice in com-
merce, there must be a showing not only of an unfair practice, but also
that a substantial segment of competition was injured or threatened to be
injured by the unfair methods." The amendments removed the requirement
of proving injury to competition, and shifted the emphasis from practices
unfair to competition to those injuring the general public, thus enabling the
FTC to protect the consumer directly.' 1
The Commission has often exercised its regulatory power within the
field of false advertising of health books, and has ordered publishers to cease
and desist from making factual and unqualified claims as to the prevention,
treatment, and cure of various diseases and conditions, and the promotion
of long life and health which could be obtained by following various diets,'s
exercises,17 and treatments's contained in publications if the Commission
found, after a full hearing, that observance of such procedures would not
produce the claimed results.
12 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
13 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
14 Id. at 648.
15 Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Pep Boys—Manny, Moe
and Jack v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941).
16 Farrar, Straus, & Cudahy, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 16,866 (1964) (advertise-
ment claimed that suggestions contained in the book "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall" would
allow the reader inter aria to lose weight without reducing calories, to protect and help
his heart, and to increase his sexual potency) ; Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 57 F.T.C. 1192
(1960) (representations were made that the ideas in the book "Folk Medicine" would
cure sickness, maintain good health, and promote life span) ; The Health Guild, 56
F.T.C. 140 (1959) (advertiser claimed that the regimen set out in his health book
provided a treatment for heart disease and cancer of all kinds) ; Natural Foods Institute,
50 F.T.C. 434 (1953) (representations were made that the consumption of certain foods
could prevent disease and promote long life and health) ; Harvest House, 41 F.T.C. 319
(1945) (representations were made that the respondent's book "The Complete Guide to
Bust Culture" contained diets and exercises which would change the size and shape of
the bust).
17 Parker Publishing Co., 56 F.T.C. 899 (1960) (respondent represented that the
methods in his book "How to Live 365 Days a Year" was a reliable treatment and cure
for many ailments, and an effective means of achieving healing without medicine or
surgery) ; National Institute for Physical Advancement, 29 F.T.C. 1008 (1939) (advertise-
ment represented that a beautiful bust could be achieved by following the exercises set
out in the book "Bust Culture").
18 Robert Holmes, Inc., 24 F.T.C. 712 (1937) was an early case in which the FTC
issued a complaint challenging the veracity of the advertisement of a health book. Here, re-
spondent claimed that those following the program set out in his home psychology course
would be cured of shyness, nervousness, and embarrassment, and would be relieved of vari-
ous ailments. In addition, respondent represented that his recommendations would "elimi-
nate poisons from the body." The FTC found that the ideas contained in the book could
not produce such results, and ordered the respondent to cease and desist from making such
unqualified statements. See also Excelsior Laboratory, Inc. v. FTC, 171 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.
1948) (advertisement stated that petitioner's garlic tablets were effective for the treatment
of high blood pressure) ; Associated Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1945)
(petitioner claimed its tablet would cure a number of human vitamin deficiencies and
physical ailments) ; Dannon Milk Products, Inc., No. 8232, FTC, September 28, 1962
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The most celebrated of the health book cases is Witkower Press, lnc.'9
Respondent, the author and publisher of a book entitled "Arthritis and Com-
mon Sense," made factual and unqualified claims in his promotional material
both as to his personal qualifications and as to the effectiveness of the treat-
ment and cure which could be enjoyed by people suffering from arthritis and
rheumatism by following the suggestions in his book. The Commission found,
on the basis of extensive medical testimony, that such cure and treatment
could not be effected by compliance with the schema outlined in the publica-
tion, and issued an order requiring respondent to refrain from making such
representations in advertising. The Commission differentiated between re-
spondent's right freely to express himself as guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment and the standard to which he must adhere in advertising this expres-
sion, concluding that the order requiring respondent to cease and desist from
representing his unsupported theories and opinions as proven scientific fact
was within the power of the FTC and not an invasion of any fundamental
liberties protected by the Constitution.2°
Although such FTC regulation is to some extent restrictive of the circu-
lation of ideas, which has been viewed by the Supreme Court as being as
important a part of freedom of speech as publication itself, 21 this regulation
has been condoned by the federal courts. While under the First Amendment
the public is entitled to every man's views and every man has the right to
express them,22 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a
decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 15 of the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments,25
 succinctly stated "There is no constitutional right to dis-
seminate false and misleading advertising."24 The argument that freedom of
speech is being impinged upon by subjecting the publishing industry to such
federal regulation of advertising could similarly be rejected in view of the
Supreme Court's statement that the business of publishing is in no different
position by virtue of the First Amendment from that of other businesses so
far as the.commerce clause is concerned, 25
 and that people engaging in such
pursuits are not free of the ordinary restraints and regulations of the modern
state.26
(complaint alleged that advertisements represented that yogurt is "nature's perfect
food" and has therapeutic properties) ; Welsh Foundation, 24 F.T.C. 976 (1937)
(representation was made that the methods contained in the book "The 7 Essentials of
Health" would prevent and cure all bodily ailments and diseases regardless of their
nature or origin).
12 57 F.T.C. 145 (1960).
20 Id. at 204.
21
 As early as 1877, the Supreme Court said, "Liberty of circulating is as essential
to that freedom [of speech and press] as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the
circulation, the publication would be of little value." Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733
(1877). See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1935).
22
 American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395 (1950).
23 52 Stat. I14 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55 (1958).
24 E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 740 (2d Cir. 1956).
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 637 (1951).
26 Id. at 641. The position that a business is not immune from regulation because
it is an agency of the press was first expressed in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
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Thus it would appear that the FTC has the power to require any adver-
tisement of a health book to indicate clearly that the views expressed therein
are matters of opinion, if it be found that such suggestions and ideas are not
based on scientific fact. This would be true whether the advertisement merely
repeats some of the ideas suggested in the book or consists of testimonials as
to the merits of the publication, notwithstanding the fact that these latter can
be seen as mere statements of opinion. This latter point was stressed in Mur-
ray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC.27 There, the respondents were manufacturers
of shoes which were specially made from moulds of customers' feet. Re-
spondents' mode of advertising consisted of circulating reprints of articles
about their product which appeared in newspapers and magazines. Such
articles contained testimonials by wearers of the shoe that the product had
cured a wide variety of foot and back ailments. The Commission found that
the shoes in fact had no therapeutic value, and that such representations con-
stituted unfair and deceptive practices. Respondents contended that the ad-
vertisements consisted of opinions expressed by consumers as to the merits
of the product, and that to prohibit the dissemination of such opinion would
be an infringement of the right of free speech. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the Commission, in deciding whether petitioners' ad-
vertisements were false and misleading, did not look to a literal interpretation
of each phrase, but rather considered the overall impression the circular would
make on the public. 28
 The court concluded that the claims in the advertise-
103, 132 (1937), where the Court said "The publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws." In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the applica-
tion of 31 1 of the Sherman Act to the activities of publishers, saying that it contains no
restrictions on "any guaranteed freedom of the press," and that it "applies to a publisher
what the law applies to others." Id. at 155-56.
27
 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962).
28
 Id. at 272. As was said in Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73
(2d Cir. 1910), "The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public—
that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, who,
in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and
general impressions." Id. at 75. The FTC itself determines whether an advertisement is
false and misleading, and may reach such conclusion if it finds that "deception may result
from the use of statements not technically false or which may be literally true." United
States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924).
The interpretation of advertisements favored by the Commission and the courts
is the over-all impression that the advertisement makes upon the prospective purchaser.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has said that "in determining whether or not
advertising is false and misleading . . • , regard must be had, not to fine spun distinctions
and arguments that may be made in excuse, but to the effect which it might reasonably
be expected to have upon the, general public." P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58(4th Cir. 1950). So too, in Arenberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942), the court
said "The buying public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh each word in an
advertisement. The ultimate impression upon the mind of the reader arises from the sum
total of not only what is said but also of all that is reasonably implied.... Advertisements
must be considered in their entirety, and as they would be read by those to whom they
appeal."
The FTC has broad discretion as to the standards to which it may insist that
advertisers conform in making representations. In General Motors Corp v. FTC, 114 F.2d
33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), the court .said "It maybe that there was no intention to mislead
and that only the careless or the incompetent could be misled. But if the Commission,
937
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ments could be construed by the casual reader to be unqualified assertions of
therapeutic worth, and that the Commission could order petitioner to rephrase
his advertisement so that this impression would not be created 2 9
Therefore, notwithstanding that an advertisement merely restates what
the book is about, as Commissioner Elman believed to be the case in Rodale,
still the FTC has the power to restrict the publication of the advertisement
should it have a tendency to mislead. Such restriction, although to some ex-
tent inhibitory of freedom of speech and circulation, would not be forbidden
by the First Amendment in view of the major public interest involved. Re-
gardless of the form of an advertisement—that is, whether it be found to
contain expressions of opinion or excerpts from the publication being adver-
tised—the FTC may insist on the most literal truthfulness of such represen-
tations if they are found to create the impression that the ideas and sug-
gestions contained in a publication will unqualifiedly produce a given result.
Such advertisement may be prohibited upon a finding that the results ap-
parently claimed in the advertisement in fact will not occur. While this
result would not effect a ban on legitimate advertising of the publication as
Commissioner Ehnan seemed to fear, it would provide for the protection of
the public from the danger of deceptive advertising in this crucial area.
MARK D. SHUMAN
Government Contracts—Disputes Clause—judicial Review—Extent of
Finality under the Wunderlich Act.—Utah Constr. CI Mining Co. v.
United States.'—Plaintiff had a contract with the Atomic Energy Com-
mission for construction of an assembly facility. Plaintiff made various claims
against the government for increased costs and for damages, some of which
claims arose under the contract, and some of which arose on alleged breaches
of contract. Plaintiff sought administrative decision on these various claims
pursuant to the standard "disputes" clause of the contract. 2
 The Advisory
having discretion to deal with these matters, thinks it best to insist upon a form of
advertising clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah 'wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err therein,' it is not for the courts to revise their judgement."
29
 This decision should be compared with that in Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124
F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941), where the court of appeals said "the publication, sale and
distribution of matter concerning an article of trade by a person not engaged or
financially interested in commerce in that trade is not an unfair or deceptive act or
practice within the contemplation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, if
the published matter, even though unfounded or untrue, represents-the publisher's honest
opinion or belief.... Congress did not intend to authorize the Federal Trade Commission
to foreclose expression of honest opinion in the course of one's business of voicing opinion.
The same opinion, however, may become material to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission and enjoinable by it if, wanting in proof or basis in fact, it is utilized
in the trade to mislead or deceive the public. , . ." Id. at 644. Cf. Koch v. FTC, 206
F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953),
1 339 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
2 The "disputes" clause involved in Utah read:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes concerning
questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the contracting
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